In many engineering problems, we want a physical characteristic y to lie within given range Y; e.g., for all possible values of the load x from 0 to x0, the resulting stress y of a mechanical structure should not exceed a given value y0. If no such design is possible, then, from the purely mathematical viewpoint, all possible designs are equally bad. Intuitively, however, a design for which y y0 for all values x 2 0; 0:99 x0] is \more probable" to work well than a design for which y y0 only for the values x 2 0; 0:5 x0]. In this paper, we describe an interval computationsrelated formalization for this subjective notion of probability. We show that this description is in good accordance with the empirical distribution of numerical data and with the problems related to estimating the lifetime of the Universe.
Introduction
General problem: the need for subjective probability on nite (and in nite) intervals. In many engineering problems, we want a physical characteristic y to lie within given range Y; e.g., a stress y of a mechanical structure should not exceed a given value y 0 ; a temperature y within a chemical reactor should not exceed a critical value y 0 after which the walls become damaged, etc. For most such problems, we know the dependence y = f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) of this characteristic y on the design parameters x 1 ; : : : ; x n , and we know the intervals x i of possible values of these parameters that correspond to a given design. We can then use interval computations to nd the corresponding range of y. If this range is completely within the desired range Y, perfect.
But what if no such design is possible? In this case, from the purely mathematical viewpoint, none of the proposed designs is completely satisfying, so all of them are equally bad. Intuitively, however, some designs seems to be more \probable" to be good for the actual (unknown) values of the parameters x i . For example, suppose that we have a single parameter x whose interval of possible values is 0; 1], then, intuitively, a design for which y = f(x) 2 Y for all values x 2 0:001; 1] is more probable to work well than a design for which y 2 Y only for the values x 2 0; 0:5].
How can we describe this subjective notion of probability? This is the main problem that we will handle in this paper. Speci cally, in this paper, we provide interval computations-related formulas for this probability.
Speci c problem: explaining (somewhat counter-intuitive) empirical results about subjective (and objective) probabilities. To design data processing algorithms with the smallest average processing time, we need to know what this \average" stands for. At rst glance, it may seem that reallife data are really \chaotic", and no probabilities are possible at all: today, we may apply our software package to elementary particles, tomorrow { to distances between the stars, etc. However, contrary to this intuitive feeling, there are stable probabilities in real-life data. This fact was rst discovered in 1881 by Simon Newcomb who noticed that the rst pages of logarithm tables (that contain numbers starting with 1) are more used than the last ones (that contain numbers starting with 9). To check why, he took all physical constants from a reference book, and counted how many of them start with 1. An intuitive expectation is that all 9 digits should be equally probable. In reality, instead of 11%, about 30% of these constants turned out to be starting with 1. In general, the fraction of constants that start with a digit d can be described as ln(d + 1) ? ln(d). In this paper, we describe a new interval computationsrelated explanation for this empirical fact, and we explain its relationship with lifetime of the Universe and with the general problem of determining subjective probabilities on nite and in nite intervals. . This is a formal change that does not a ect our knowledge, like a change from Kelvin to centigrade in measuring temperature. Therefore, it is natural to assume that the subjective probabilities do not change under this change.
For example, suppose that we know that (in centigrade) the temperature is from the interval 0; 50], and we are interested in the subjective probability that the temperature is actually from the interval 0,20]. This probability is p 0;50] ( 0; 20]): In Kelvin, this same question has a di erent numerical meaning.
Here, the initial information is that T 2 273; 323], and we are interested in the probability that it this temperature is actually in the interval 273; 293]. So, the probability of the same event can be described as p 273 Unit-invariance. The third requirement is unit-invariance. If we change the unit in which we measure the physical quantity (i.e., go from inches to centimeters), then, the numerical values of this quantity change as x ! x for some > 0 (= the ratio of the old and the new units). The probabilities must not change under this change either. So, we arrive at the formula p a;b] (X) = p a; b] ( X).
As a result, we arrive at the following de nitions:
3 Subjective Probability on Finite Intervals:
De nitions and the Resulting Description (1D Case)
In this paper, we will use the following standard de nitions: (see, e.g., 11, 15]):
Background de nitions. For a given set X, a class A of subsets of X is called a -algebra ( -eld) if it is closed under countable union and complement (hence, under countable intersection). A probability space (X; A; P) is a triple consisting of a set X, a -algebra A of subsets from X, and a probability measure P, i.e., a -additive mapping P : A ! 0; 1] for which P(X) = 1. Elements of A are called measurable sets.
We will follow the tradition of probability theory and consider only complete probability spaces, i.e., spaces for which every subset A B of any set B of probability 0 (P (B) = 0) also belongs to B and has probability 0.
By an interval, we will mean a non-degenerate closed interval a; b] (i.e., an interval for which a < b). For an arbitrary n, by a box, we mean a set a 1 ; b 1 ] : : : a n ; b n ], where a 1 ; b 1 ]; : : : ; a n ; b n ] are intervals.
The standard Lebesgue measure on IR n will be de ned by n . The 1D Lebesgue measure will be also called a length, the 2D measure will be called an area, and a general n-dimensional measure will be called a volume.
De nition 1. By a 1D subjective pre-probability, we mean a function p that to every interval a; b], puts into correspondence a probability space (IR Reminder. By 1 (X), we denoted the length of the interval X.
(For readers' convenience, all the proofs are placed in the special Proofs section.) Comment 1. In Proposition 1, we started with the situation in which we know nothing about the probability of di erent values x 2 a; b], and we used natural symmetry requirements to uniquely determine these probabilities. This result is not unexpected: we started with reasonable conditions and we ended up with reasonable probabilities.
The main reason why we explicitly formulated this result (which, by itself, is not very unsurprising) is to show that the symmetry ideas are indeed in good accordance with common sense. We hope that this makes our further use of these ideas { in less predictable situations { more convincing.
The fact that symmetries can help in case of uncertainty is no accident; we have used symmetry in our previous interval-related papers:
In 18], we used symmetry to nd the optimal selection of a side to bisect.
In 23], we used symmetry to select an optimal formula for the so-called \"-in ation".
In 21], we used symmetry to optimally select a sub-box.
In 25], we used symmetry for several other computational problems. Comment 2. We get the same uniform distribution as in Proposition 1 if we use a Maximum Entropy approach (see, e.g., 16, 20, 22] 
Applications: 1D Case
The natural uniform distribution has been used to describe subjective probability of di erent subintervals in numerous areas. Earthquake engineering. In 7] , uniform distributions are used to gauge the probability with which di erent design are earthquake-proof.
Technical diagnostics and manufacturing. In 17, 26, 27] , uniform distribution is used to describe the probability that the value x of the physical parameter about which we only know that x 2 a; b] actually exceeds the critical value x 0 (when a < x 0 < b).
Material science. In 24] , the uniform distribution is used to select a material that has the largest probability of having thermophysical properties within a desired range.
Metrology. In 24] , the uniform distribution is used to select a sensor that has the largest probability of covering the desired range of values.
Lifetime of the Universe and similar problems. An interesting use of uniform distribution in problems like estimating the lifetime of the Universe comes from R. Gott 10]. Gott's main idea is as follows. Suppose that we are witnessing some process that started at a moment t s (not necessarily known) and that will end at the moment t e (also not necessarily known). In accordance with the above result, the current observation time t is uniformly distributed on the interval t s ; t e ]. Therefore, the probability that t happens to be in the rst 5% of this interval (i.e., in the interval t s ; t s + 0:05 (t e ? t s )]), is equal to 5% (5% is just an example, any other small value will do). So, with 95% probability, the current moment of time t is later than t s + 0:05 (t e ? t s ).
Suppose now that we know t s and t, but we do not know t e . We have already argued that with a 95% probability, t t s + 0:05 (t e ? t s ). This inequality leads to t ?t s 0:05 (t e ? t s ) and t e ? t s 20 (t ? t s ). In other words, with a 95% probability, the total lifetime t e ? t s of a process does not exceed 20 times its current age. Here are some examples of Gott's conclusions:
For the humanity (current age 200; 000 years), Gott concludes that with a 95% probability, its lifetime will not exceed 20 200; 000 = 4 million years.
For the Universe (current age 20 billion years), with a 95% probability, Gott's conclusion is that its lifetime will not exceed 20 20 = 400 billion years.
For the computer era (started in 1994, 50 years old), Gott's conclusion is that it will probably last for 1000 more years.
Subjective Probability on Multi-D Finite Intervals: De nition and the Resulting Description
Comment. Let's now consider a multi-dimensional case, i.e., the case when we are describing the values of several physical quantities x 1 ; : : : ; x n . In this case, interval information can be described by a box B = a 1 ; b 1 ] : : : a n ; b n ].
On each box B, we want to de ne a probability measure p B .
De nition 6. By a n-dimensional subjective pre-probability, we mean a function p that to every n-dimensional box B = a 1 ; b 1 ] : : : a n ; b n ], puts into correspondence a probability space (IR n ; A B ; p B ) for which the value p B (C) is de ned for all n-dimensional boxes C, and the probability measure p B is localized on the box B (i.e., p B (B) = 1).
De nition 7. We say that an n-dimensional subjective pre-probability p is consistent if for arbitrary n-dimensional boxes B and C, and for an arbitrary set X 2 A C , we have X \ C 2 A B and p B (X \ C) = p B (C) p C (X).
Comment. In particular, if p B (C) > 0, we get a formula
that is similar to the above 1D formula.
Background de nition. For a set X IR n and a vectorc 2 IR n , the shift X +c is de ned as fx +c jx 2 Xg and the productc X is de ned componentwise, as fc x jx 2 Xg, wherec x def = (c 1 x 1 ; : : : ; c n x n ).
De nition 8. An n-dimensional subjective pre-probability p is called shiftinvariant if for every n-dimensional box B, for every vector c 2 IR n , and for every set X 2 A B , the shift X +c belongs to A B+c and p B (X) = p B+c (X +c). De nition 9. An n-dimensional subjective pre-probability p is called unitinvariant if for every n-dimensional box B, for every vector~ 2 IR n with positive components, and for every set X 2 A B , the product~ X belongs to A~ B and p B (X) = p~ B (~ X).
De nition 10. An n-dimensional subjective pre-probability p is called 1D subjective probability if it is consistent, shift-invariant, and unit-invariant. Comment. Motivations for these requirements are similar to the motivations for the 1-dimensional case: shift means changing the starting points of all n quantities, and unit-invariance means changing n measuring units.
Proposition 2. If p is a subjective n-dimensional probability, then
Reminder. By n (X), we denoted the volume (n-dimensional Lebesgue measure) of the box B. On a box a b, we have a naturally de ned (subjective) probability. A natural idea is therefore to choose an interval for which the probability that a b is greater than the probability that b a, i.e., the probability p a b (f(a; b) j a bg) that a b is greater than 1/2.
Another possibility is to take into consideration that the inequality a b is equivalent to a ? b 0. Since we know that a 2 a and that b 2 b, we can conclude that the di erence x def = a ? b belongs to the interval a ? b. So, as the desired probability, we can take the conditional probability that the number x is non-negative under the condition that x 2 a?b, i.e., the conditional probability p a?b 0; 1).
It turns out that both ways lead to the same selection: 2 . Comment 1. This criterion is actually used in a expert system shell FEST described in 34]. According to this criterion, out of several values known with interval uncertainty, we select a one for which the midpoint is larger (if we are looking for a maximum). Comment 2. The above idea means that even if we have a 50.1% probability that a is better than b, we reject b and choose a. In many cases, we do not want to make a rejection decision on such weak a basis. So, we may choose a value p 0 > 1=2, and reject an alternative c only if there exists another alternative a with P(a > b) p 0 .
To be able to make these choices, we must be able to compute the corresponding probabilities. The formulas are provided by the following proposition: Then, we de ne the desired probability as the conditional probability that a b on the condition that a 2 A and b 2 B, i.e., as
where p is the subjective 2-dimensional probability.
This de nition uses the intervals a and b, but the result turn out to be independent on them. Reminder. k denotes a k?dimensional Lebesgue measure: length for k = 1, and area for k = 2.
Comments 1. The proof follows directly from the formulas for subjective 2-dimensional probability. An in nite interval 1; 1) is a limit case of a nite interval 1; N] when N ! 1. So, a natural idea is to apply the above-described approach to compute the probability p(N) = p 1;N ] ( 1; a 0 ]) and then tend to the limit N ! 1.
Unfortunately, this idea does not work: due to Proposition 1, p(N) = a 0 ? 1 N ? c ; and so, in the limit, we get probability 0.
Physical problem: lifetime of the Universe. This mathematical argument can be easily reformulated in commonsense terms. Let us assume that we live in an in nite Universe that starts at time 0 and goes on and on. If the Universe is 1 billion years old, then according to Gott's argument, with probability 95%, we are not in its rst 50 million year. If the Universe is 100 billion years old, then with the same probability, we cannot be in its rst 5 billion years. As we increase the lifetime, these rst 5% spread to the entire Universe. We therefore arrive at a counter-intuitive conclusion that with a probability 95%, we cannot be in any time of the Universe. The same conclusion can be made if instead of 95%, we take 99.9%, etc.
Practical problem: Benford's law. This problem with the lifetime of the Universe may look somewhat theoretical: after all, in modern physics, the prevailing view is that the Universe is nite (it should be mentioned that several respected cosmologists believe that the Universe may turn out to be in nite). However, there is another example when the above approach does not work well: the problem of dirty pages of logarithm tables. In 1881, Simon Newcomb, a well-known astronomer, noticed that the rst pages of logarithm tables (that contain numbers starting with 1) are more used than the last ones (that contain numbers starting with 9) (for a detailed description and references, see 14]). To check why, he took all physical constants from a reference book, and counted how many of them start with 1. If real numbers representing physical constants were distributed uniformly, we would expect all 9 possible rst digits appear with the same probability of 11%. In reality, instead of 11%, about 30% of these constants turned out to be starting with 1. In general, the fraction of constants that start with a digit d can be described as ln(d + 1) ? ln(d).
This empirical fact was later rediscovered by F. Benford 2] and is therefore known as Benford's law.
A similar law describes not only physical constants, it also describes di erent types of data ranging from stock exchange to census data to accounting-related numbers. Benford's law is not simply a curious empirical phenomenon, it has been successfully used to, e.g., uncover accounting fraud: actual numbers satisfy this law, while the cooked up data usually follow the uniform distribution. It is therefore important to gure out why this law is so frequent in real life.
Benford's law: additional problem and attempts to solve it. This problem is more di cult that one might think because not only the corresponding distribution is di erent from the seemingly natural uniform distribution, it is di cult to gure out what distribution we have at all. Several authors (see, e.g., 29, 9, 30]) deduced this formula from the requirement similar to our unitinvariance (which they call scale-invariance). Crudely speaking, they deduce the formula p( a; a]) = const (ln(a) ? ln(a)): We say \crudely speaking" because ln(x) ! 1 as x ! 1, so the above formula cannot describe an actual probability distribution; in reality, the authors use some tricks:
In 29], only the invariance of the digit distribution is required.
In 9], p is de ned as a limit of probability measures, and invariance is formulated for this limit { which is not a probability measure.
In 30], p is de ned as a nitely additive measure that is not ?additive. In 6, 12] , the logarithmic distribution is deduced from the following fact: the values of the physical constants are usually obtained by processing data, i.e., by applying several (usually, many) arithmetic operations to the initial data. It turned out that if we start with some random numbers, and apply many (n) arithmetic operations, then as n ! 1, the distribution of the rst digit of the result approaches the logarithmic distribution. Therefore, the logarithmic distribution is a good approximation for large n.
Probably the most mathematically satisfying derivation comes from considering a collection of di erent probability distributions instead of a single one 13, 14].
What we are planning to do. In this paper, we describe a new interval computations-related explanation for Benford's law, and we show how this law is related to the general problem of determining subjective probabilities on nite and in nite intervals.
Subjective Probability on In nite Intervals
It turns out that a natural way to avoid the above problems in the in nite case is not to require some of the conditions that we had for nite case. Let's do it for our problem. Namely, we will skip shift-invariance.
Background de nition. By an in nite interval, we mean a set a; 1) IR, with a > 0.
De nition 13. By a 1D subjective pre-probability on in nite intervals, we mean a function p that to every in nite interval a; 1), a > 0, puts into correspondence a probability space (IR; A a;1) ; p a;1) ) for which the value p a;1) ( c; d])
is de ned for all ( nite or in nite) intervals c; d], and the probability measure p a;1) is localized on the interval a; 1) (i.e., p a;1) ( a; 1)) = 1). De nition 14. We say that a 1D subjective pre-probability p on in nite intervals is consistent if for arbitrary in nite intervals a; 1) and c; 1), and for an arbitrary set X 2 A c;1) , we have X \ c; 1) 2 A a;1) and p a;1) (X \ c; 1)) = p a;b] ( c; 1)) p c;1) (X). Comment. In particular, if p a;infty) ( c; 1)) > 0, we get a formula p c;1) (X) = p a;1) (X \ c; 1)) p a;1) ( c; 1)) that is similar to the formulas for nite intervals.
De nition 15. A 1D subjective pre-probability p on in nite intervals is called unit-invariant if for every in nite interval a; 1), for every 2 IR ( > 0), and for every set X 2 A a;1) , the product X belongs to A a;1) and p a;1) (X) = p a;1) ( X).
De nition 16. 1D subjective pre-probability p on in nite intervals is called 1D subjective probability on in nite intervals if it is consistent and unit-invariant. For in nite regions, in which we can have in nitely many subregions of equal length, these subregions cannot have equal probabilities: otherwise, the sum of these probabilities { which should be bounded by 1 { will instead be in nite.
Therefore, when we deal with in nite regions, we have to abandon some seemingly natural assumptions. Without these assumptions, we get a more general expression characterized by a parameter q. When q = ?1, we get the expression from Proposition 1, an expression that works well for nite intervals but for which, for in nite regions, the overall probability becomes in nite. If we want the overall probability to be nite, we must have q > 0 { in which case subregions of equal length have di erent probabilities. Comment 2. According to Proposition 8, we have a 1-parametric family of probability distributions, that depends on a parameter q. For a nite subinterval, the distribution should be approximately uniform, so we expect the value of q to be small. When q is small, we can simplify the expression for probabilities This formula is very similar to Benford's law. Indeed, the following Propositions shows that the Benford's law can be thus explained.
Proposition 9. Assume that p is a subjective 1-dimensional probability p on in nite intervals, and that we know that x 2 1; 1). Then, there exists a q > 0 such that the probability that the rst signi cant digit in the decimal represen- Thus, when q is small, Benford's law is a good approximation for the actual probability. Comment 2. In the Proofs section, we provide the proof of this result. In addition to that proof, we want to give its intuitive explanation. Namely, let's compute the conditional probability of x having a leading digit d we must divide this probability by the probability that x 10 N , which is q ln(10 N ) = q N ln (10) . After division, we get the desired formula. Computer rounding. Benford's law is used for comparing di erent roundings in computer arithmetic, so that we can choose the rounding algorithm for which the average error (in the sense of the empirical distribution) is the smallest 8].
Computer representation of real numbers. A new computer representation of real numbers has been designed, that decreases the average rounding errors (\average" in the sense of this empirical distribution) 6, 32, 33] . This representation is called a sli (symmetric level index) arithmetic, and it is de ned as follows: for integers x, we de ne (x) as follows: (0) = 0, (x+1) = exp( (x)) (so that (1) = e, (2) = e e , etc). This function is extended to a function that is de ned for all real numbers and maps R to 1; 1). So, a number 1 can be represented as (r) for some r. Then, an arbitrary real number x is represented as a triple consisting of a rational number r and two signs, for which x = (r) 1 . An interval is represented as by its upper and lower endpoints.
10 Multi-Dimensional Case: In nite Intervals Background de nition. By an in nite box, we mean a set B = a 1 ; 1) : : : a n ; 1), where a i > 0 for all i. De nition 17. By an n-dimensional subjective pre-probability on in nite intervals, we mean a function p that to every in nite n-dimensional box B = a 1 ; 1) : : : a n ; 1), puts into correspondence a probability space (IR n ; A B ; p B )
for which the value p B (C) is de ned for all ( nite or in nite) boxes C, and the probability measure p B is localized on the box B (i.e., p B (B) = 1).
De nition 18. We say that an n-dimensional subjective pre-probability p on in nite intervals is consistent if for arbitrary in nite n-dimensional boxes B and C, and for an arbitrary set X 2 A C , we have X \ C 2 A B and p B (X \ C) = p B (C) p C (X). Comment. In particular, if p C (X) > 0, we get a formula
that is similar to the formulas for nite boxes.
De nition 19. An n-dimensional subjective pre-probability p on in nite intervals is called unit-invariant if for every in nite n-dimensional box B, for every vector~ 2 IR n with positive components, and for every set X 2 A B , the product X belongs to A~ B and p B (X) = p~ B (~ X). De nition 20. An n-dimensional subjective pre-probability p on in nite intervals is called n-dimensional subjective probability on in nite intervals if it is consistent and unit-invariant. Comment. Here, as in the case of nite intervals, unit-invariance means changing n measuring units. Proposition 10. If p is a subjective n-dimensional probability, then there exist positive real numbers q 1 ; : : : ; q n such that when B = a 1 ; 1) : : : a n ; 1), So, the case q < 1 is also impossible. 7:3 . So, the only possible value is q = 1. ii) ( 34] ) According to Proposition 2, 2-dimensional subjective probability is proportional to the area. So, the desired probability is equal to the fraction whose denominator is the area (a ? This equivalence was proved only under the auxiliary condition a b. If p 1=2, then this condition is satis ed (else, the probability is 0). So, to complete the proof of this equivalence, it is necessary to proof that if a+a b+b, 
Proof of Proposition 8
This proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. Let us denote p 1;1) ( ; 1)) by f( ), where 1 < 1. This value is de ned for all , because we assumed that all measures p a;1) are de ned for all the intervals c; d] ( nite or in nite).
1 . Since p 1;1) is a probability measure, the function f is monotonically nondecreasing, and f( ) ! 0 as ! 1.
2 . From the condition that the measure p 1;1) is localized on the interval 1; 1), we can conclude that f(1) = 1.
3 . As a particular case of a consistency requirement, we conclude that for arbitrary 1 and 1, we have p 1;1) ( ; 1)) = p 1;1) ( ; 1)) p ;1) ( ; 1)):
In our denotations, the left-hand side of this equality is f( ), and the rst term in the right-hand side is f( ). Applying unit-invariance (with = ?1 ) to the second term in the right-hand side, we conclude that the second term in the right-hand side of this equality is equal to p 1;1) ( ; 1)), i.e., in our notations, to f( ). So, the above equality takes the form f( ) = f( ) f( ). The general case follows from unit-invariance. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9
The set of all the numbers 1 whose rst digit is d This sum is well known and equal to D=(1 ? c). This is exactly the desired formula. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10
This proof is similar to the proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 9.
1 . If we x the component intervals of all the variables but one at 1; 1), we get the 1-dimensional measure that satis es all the conditions of Proposition 9.
Therefore, from Proposition 9, we conclude that for some constants q i , 2 . Let's illustrate the remaining part of the proof on the example of n = 2 (for n > 2, the proof is quite similar). Suppose that we have two in nite intervals c i ; 1), and we want to nd an expression for p I (C) for an in nite box C = c 1 ; 1) c 2 ; 1). Due to consistency, we have p I (C) = p I ( 1; 1) c 2 ; 1)) p 1;1) c2;1) ( c 1 ; 1) c 2 ; 1)):
Because of 1 , the rst factor in the right-hand side of this formula is equal to . Since p is a probability measure, we have p(F 1 \F 2 ) = p(F 1 ) + p(F 2 ) ? p (F 1 F 2 ) . So, to compute p(F), it is su cient to be able to compute p(F 1 ), p(F 2 ), and the probability of the union F 1 F 2 .
3:1 . The union F 1 F 2 of these two boxes is an in nite box c 1 ; 1) c 2 ; 1) for which we already know the probabilities.
3:2 . The set F 1 can be represented as a di erence between the two in nite boxes, so p(F 1 ) = p( c 1 ; 1) c 2 ; 1)) ? p( c 2 ; 1) c 2 ; 1)) (strictly speaking, we need to use semi-open intervals, and use a limit procedure as in the proof of Proposition 9). 3:3 . From these expressions, we will get the desired formula for the probability measure. Q.E.D. The authors are thankful to the anonymous referees for useful comments.
